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Abstract— Risk analysis is critical for IT systems and for 
organizations and their daily operation. There are various 
tools and methods to analyse risk. Most approaches take 
risk assessment as a result of specific factors (such as 
threats and vulnerabilities) without investigating the 
impact of various types of system operation. Therefore, we 
suggest a causal approach toward risk analysis based on 
an existing security model.  We start out from a current 
risk analysis method and improve it by taking the system 
operation, causal relation between the impairments, as 
well as latency effects into account. The approach exhibits 
the impact of the attack chain of impairments on system 
risk. We claim that the approach presented in this paper 
will make it possible to conduct a more refined 
quantitative assessment of risk.  
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Most IT organizations need to deal with different types 
of daily decision making such as budget planning and 
security investment choices. Risk analysis is a critical 
task performed by CIOs and managers enhancing the 
decision making process. Although formal risk analysis 
is required by ANSI 2008 (for IT systems) and Basel II 
(Financial regulations for Operational Risk), it is not 
necessarily part of the current security management of 
many IT organizations. 
Due to the criticality of a precise method for assessing 
risk while making decisions, we suggest a novel 
approach toward risk analysis based on the causal chain 
of impairments. See section III.B. This approach is 
founded upon a previously proposed security model 
[10], where security is quantified according to its 
interaction with the environment. The model can be 
applied to risk analysis so as to incorporate influence 
from internal system operations. 
There have been various proposals for risk calculations 
within organizations and industry. These methods vary 
from qualitative to quantitative risk analysis. 
Qualitative approaches are useful for more abstract 
levels of analysis and comparison. However, risk 
quantification methods such as Reduced Risk [5], [25] 
and Risk based Return on Investments (RROI) [7] take 
us one step further and offer more refined information 
on system risk by identifying the gained benefit or 
reduced risks.  
Current approaches for risk analysis and quantification 
are in many cases based on a very simplistic assumption 
about the relation between risk event and risk impact. 
What is missing in these methods is the probabilistic 
influence from the system operation, internal 
mechanisms and the impairments on system risk. 
Indeed, other authors have suggested more refined risk 
analysis methods, such as the probabilistic distribution 
among successful attacks [23] or calculating the effect 
of aggregating different tasks in a complex business 
process [24]. However, none of them has adopted the 
full input-output causal approach as the one presented 
in this paper.  
Thus, we suggest that risk analysis should incorporate 
the influence of the propagation of impairments, system 
operation and latency on the system behaviour (output). 
This means that for a single attack (input) all possible 
outcomes (outputs) are calculated with their respective 
probability and delay, so as to add up to a composite 
risk assessment.  
In the following, section II gives a brief summary of the 
current research state in risk analysis. The security 
model and its chain of impairments are described in 
section III. In section IV the implications of the model 
to risk analysis is discussed. The paper is concluded in 
section V.  
II.     CURRENT STATE IN RISK ANALSYSIS RESEARCH   
There have been quite a number of approaches toward 
risk assessment and analysis. We will not try to cover 
all the existing approaches and tools but rather give a 
brief review over some representative methodologies. 
In this paper we adopt the definition by Ralston et al. 
[5] where risk assessment is defined as a multiphase 
process consisting of Risk Identification, Risk Analysis, 
Risk Evaluation and Ranking, and Management and 
Treatment phases. Risk assessment can be categorized 
into two main categories i.e. qualitative and 
quantitative. One general issue that should be noted for 
both groups is the necessity of identifying resources to 
be protected (targets), the threats in the environment, 
and vulnerabilities existing within the systems. A novel 
qualitative security risk assessment approach based on 
vulnerability analysis has been proposed by Elahi et al. 
[20] which is applicable in early requirement 
engineering phase. A list of existing risk assessment 
tools is provided by the Riskworld website [22] among 
which OCTAVE [27], RISKWATCH [28] and CORAS 
[26] are common.  
Quantitative risk analysis methods are subcategories of 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment methods (PRA) [5] 
where the risk associated with complex technological 
entities is analyzed by assuming to have the knowledge 
about different risks in the system. Different scenarios, 
frequencies, and their consequences in terms of impact 
are presented in PRA. In this approach, the risk metric 
is a consequence-oriented figure of merit, e.g. the 
probability of the top event [5]. However, determining 
the basic event probabilities is the most challenging 
phase in this approach. See [2], [4] for more details on 
PRA. Some of the popular PRA methods are 
Fault/Attack Tree Analysis [1-3], Event Tree Analysis 
[2], Failure Mode and Effect Analysis [15], [16], 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis [17], [18], 
Cause/Consequence Analysis, Directed graphs and 
logical diagrams methods [4] and MORDA [21].  
Another approach for risk assessment is the cost-benefit 
risk assessment model proposed by Wyss et al. [8]. In 
this approach the decision makers are capable to 
perform risk-based cost-benefit prioritization of various 
security investments/mechanisms. Their risk metric is 
based on the degree of difficulty for a successful attack 
(effort-based approach). 
One of the most commonly used quantitative risk 
models is RROI (Risk based Return On Investment) [7] 
which calculates risk based on net bypass rate, incident 
risk, baseline scenario, and net benefit as shown in 
equation (1).  
  𝑅𝑅𝑂𝐼 =  𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜−𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘−𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
         (1) 
 
Return On Security Investment [6] is a similar approach 
based on ROI and calculates risk as shown in equation 
(2). This approach incorporates risk exposure and 
percentage of risk mitigated for different security 
mechanisms when calculating ROSI therefore 
enhancing comparison between these mechanisms. 
 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝐼 = (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒∗%𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)−𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡   
       (2) 
 
Influence and Decisions Diagrams [13], is a decision 
driven approach toward risk analysis that calculates risk 
based on utility functions and net benefits.  
A model-based approach for quantitative enterprise 
security assessment (Quality of Protection) was 
provided by [23]. In this model the number of attacks 
from certain threats is measured and their relative 
likelihood of propagation among the “dependencies” in 
the underlying enterprise model is estimated. This 
approach is based on a “Security Meta Model” and 
“Threat Graph”, which is relatively similar to the attack 
tree concept. The Security Meta Model defines risk as 
“any threat that targets a specific model element and 
may result in the violation of a security requirement”.  
Quantified risk is another proposed method for the 
decision-making process in security [15]. This method 
is based on the probabilities and losses of events. Thus, 
prospect theory, rationality, reframing and normative 
frameworks have been discussed in detail. 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security proposed the 
following equation (3) to calculate risk based on 
vulnerabilities, threats, and their impact [9]. 
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐t        (3)
  
Where: 
• Threat denotes the expected number of attacks 
of a particular type within a specified time unit 
• Vulnerability is the extent to which the 
organization or system is vulnerable to the 
threat and gets affected, and 
• Impact is the costs of the harm as loss in terms 
of monetary/reputation/market loss. 
 
This approach is useful for calculating risk for different 
IT systems in hostile environments.  
The most common formula for calculating risk is 
presented in equation (4).  
 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠                                   (4) 
 
This approach is the basis of our proposal in the paper.  
The risk of a bad event exposure is calculated according 
to the loss (consequences) and its probability/likelihood 
of occurrence (frequency). We discuss more about this 
method in section IV. 
 
III.    SECURITY MODEL AND CHAIN OF IMPAIRMENTS 
In this section we explain the security model, which is 
the basis for our proposal on model based risk analysis. 
Furthermore we discuss the causal chain of impairments 
and its role in risk analysis. 
A. The security model 
Previously we have introduced an integrated security 
and dependability model based on the system’s 
interaction with its environment [10]. The basic idea 
behind this model is to analyse system security in 
relation to its environment, in terms of system input and 
output thus enhancing the cause and effect concept.  
The model proposes three categories of security 
attributes: protective, correctness, and behavioural. The 
protective attribute is integrity, which identifies a 
system’s capability of preventing fault introduction. 
The output from the system is considered as the system 
behaviour. The behaviour must be different for 
authorized users and unauthorized users. Thus, the 
requirement on the system is that it must deliver its 
information (or service) to authorized users. This is the 
availability attribute. However, it must not deliver 
information to unauthorized users, as reflected by the 
confidentiality requirement. Other behavioural 
attributes are reliability and safety. See [10], [11] for 
more details. 
B. Chain of Impairments 
One of the advantages of our security model is its clear 
exhibition of the causal chain of impairments, from 
threat and attack to the system failure, see Figure 1. 
This (cause and effect concept) is the basis of our 
proposed approach toward risk analysis. Here we give 
an explanation of the causal chain of impairments. 
An attack is launched by a threat from the system’s 
input environment. If successful in bypassing the 
boundary protection mechanisms (if any) there is an 
intrusion, which puts the system in an unwanted state. 
This system state is called an internal system error. 
Depending on recovery mechanisms and system 
operations there are three possible outcomes of this 
situation. The first case is when some internal recovery 
mechanism is able to remove the error. Thus, no failure 
(behavioural failure) will occur. A second case is when 
the error becomes latent in the system until it 
propagates to the output thus causing a failure after 
some delay, which may be short or long. The latency 
time varies based on the attacker intention, system 
operation, and error characteristics. See [14]. Please 
note that a high latency, i.e. a long delay before the 
output is influenced, is equivalent to better system 
behaviour, e.g. higher reliability, and thus reduced risk. 
In the limit, i.e. for an infinite latency, there will be no 
risk at all. The final case happens when the system 
failure occurs without noticeable delay, as a result of 
negligible error latency.   
Thus, we see how an attack may cause an error that 
propagates to cause a failure. This highlights the 
relation between integrity on one side and behavioural 
attributes such as reliability, availability, safety and 
confidentiality on the other. The relation between the 
attacks and the service is a complicated issue that calls 
for further investigation of internal system factors and 
the attack characteristics. 
However, there are other causes for system failure other 
than malicious attacks. Another such case is when a 
failure occurs without any external threat or attack, e.g. 
due to the breakdown of a physical component. Figure 1 
illustrates the main phases of the causal chain of 
impairments of the attack process.   
 
Figure 1. Chain of Impairments and Risk 
IV.      IMLICATIONS OF THE SECURITY MODEL FOR RISK 
ANALYSIS 
In this section we show how the security model could 
be used for making a refined and more detailed risk 
analysis that would also incorporate influence from the 
system’s internal operation.  
A. Rationale 
Risk is basically an interpretation of the event 
occurrence probability by assessing its effects on our 
system. The traditional and common definition of risk 
analysis covers the answers to the three fundamental 
questions [8], [19]: 
1. What can happen? 
2. What is the probability (likelihood) of it to 
happen? 
3. What are the consequences and impact (loss) 
if something happens?  
Based on these questions we formulate risk by the 
following equation.  
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 = 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠         (5)
                                                       
Where: 
• Event denotes some kind of initiating 
detrimental influence on the system, e.g. an 
attack, possibly leading to a system failure, 
• Likelihood denotes the probability of the 
Event occurrence, and 
• Loss/Impact indicates the resulting 
consequences caused by the Event including 
monetary, resource or other loss 
Although this approach is being applied to decision 
making processes by CIOs and managers, it has a major 
shortage. The main issue is that it has an abstract 
perspective and does not take the cause and effect 
relations between input events and output effects into 
account. 
B. An improved method for risk analysis 
In this section we propose an improved approach for 
risk analysis. This approach takes the system’s 
operation, the internal factors and the chain of 
impairments into account for risk analysis, which means 
that we can more accurately model risk analysis than 
before. It is worthy to note that different types of Events 
can lead to similar types of failures. This is the result of 
the effect of varying impairment propagation and 
dynamic system operations. On the other hand, and for 
the same type of reasons, the same Event can cause 
different types of failures, where each type of failure 
comes with a specific probability. Thus, there is not a 
one-to-one relation between an Event and the 
corresponding Impact as described in equation (5). 
Rather, the relation is a probabilistic one-to-many, in 
the sense that each generating event can lead to several 
failures and several corresponding losses, all of them 
with a related probability. This can be reflected in the 
following improved equation for risk assessment: 
 RISK= Event * Likelihood *          
Ʃ (Probability of Propagation * Loss)                         (6)                                                                                                                           
 
Here: 
• Event denotes some kind of initiating 
detrimental influence on the system, e.g. an 
attack, possibly leading to a system failure, 
• Likelihood (Probability of Occurrence) is the 
probability that the Event occurs,  
• Probability of Propagation is the probability 
that an Event leads to a specific failure. This 
failure is one of the possible failures that may 
result from a specific Event, 
• Loss is the loss (e.g. in EUR) associated with 
each failure that the Event can lead to, and 
• Sum is taken over all possible failures related 
to one specific Event with their related losses. 
 
Thus, equation (6) permits considering influence from 
system-internal factors on the risk assessment, 
something that is not possible when using equation (5). 
This is addressed by taking the sum over all different 
propagations of system internal operation initiated by 
the same Event. As mentioned in section III.B the same 
Event might lead to various failures. For instance in a 
PC depending on an antivirus program, the same threat 
can lead to different system failures depending on the 
various outcomes of the program and these will all be 
taken into account in the risk calculation. 
V.   CONCLUSION  
We have proposed an improved approach to risk 
analysis and quantification. The approach is based on 
an earlier suggested security model and its causal chain 
of impairments. The model describes system security 
based on its interaction with the environment. 
Accordingly the proposed risk analysis method provides 
a clear exhibition of the system operation and attack 
impact on system behaviour and in particular system 
failure. Therefore, this approach is more fine-grained 
than many other risk analysis methods. However, the 
probabilistic relations among different system’s internal 
operations/mechanisms and their influence on the 
system failure call for further investigation. As a 
conclusion, this approach improves risk analysis by 
considering more details about system operation.  
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